



CONTENTS

Foreword: François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana

xiii

- one** 10 January 1979 1
Questions of method. ~ Suppose universals do not exist. ~ Summary of the previous year's lectures: the limited objective of the government of raison d'État (external politics) and unlimited objective of the police state (internal politics). ~ Law as principle of the external limitation of raison d'État. ~ Perspective of this year's lectures: political economy as principle of the internal limitation of governmental reason. ~ What is at stake in this research: the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth and the effects of its inscription in reality. ~ What is liberalism?
- two** 17 January 1979 27
Liberalism and the implementation of a new art of government in the eighteenth century. ~ Specific features of the liberal art of government (I): (1) The constitution of the market as site of the formation of truth and not just as domain of jurisdiction. ~ Questions of method. The stakes of research undertaken around madness, the penal order, and sexuality: sketch of a history of "regimes of veridiction." ~ The nature of a political critique of knowledge (savoir). ~ (2) The problem of limiting the exercise of power by public authorities. Two types of solution: French juridical radicalism and English utilitarianism. ~ The question of "utility" and limiting the exercise of power by public authorities. ~ Comment on the status of heterogeneity in history: strategic

against dialectical logic. ~ The notion of “interest” as operator (opérateur) of the new art of government.

- three** 24 January 1979 51
- Specific features of the liberal art of government (II): (3) The problem of European balance and international relations. ~ Economic and political calculation in mercantilism. The principle of the freedom of the market according to the physiocrats and Adam Smith: birth of a new European model. ~ Appearance of a governmental rationality extended to a world scale. Examples: the question of maritime law; the projects of perpetual peace in the eighteenth century. ~ Principles of the new liberal art of government: a “governmental naturalism”; the production of freedom. ~ The problem of liberal arbitration. Its instruments: (1) the management of dangers and the implementation of mechanisms of security; (2) disciplinary controls (Bentham’s panopticism); (3) interventionist policies. ~ The management of liberty and its crises.*
- four** 31 January 1979 75
- Phobia of the state. ~ Questions of method: sense and stakes of the bracketing off of a theory of the state in the analysis of mechanisms of power. ~ Neo-liberal governmental practices: German liberalism from 1948 to 1962; American neo-liberalism. ~ German neo-liberalism (I). ~ Its political-economic context. ~ The scientific council brought together by Erhard in 1947. Its program: abolition of price controls and limitation of governmental interventions. ~ The middle way defined by Erhard in 1948 between anarchy and the “termite state.” ~ Its double meaning: (a) respect for economic freedom as condition of the state’s political representativity; (b) the institution of economic freedom as basis for the formation of political sovereignty. ~ Fundamental characteristic of contemporary German governmentality: economic freedom, the source of juridical legitimacy and political consensus. ~ Economic growth, axis of a new historical consciousness enabling the break with the past. ~ Rallying of Christian Democracy and the SPD*

to liberal politics. ~ The principles of liberal government and the absence of a socialist governmental rationality.

- | | | |
|-------------|--|-----|
| five | 7 February 1979 | 101 |
| | <p><i>German neo-liberalism (II). ~ Its problem: how can economic freedom both found and limit the state at the same time? ~ The neo-liberal theorists: W. Eucken, F. Böhm, A. Müller-Armack, F. von Hayek. ~ Max Weber and the problem of the irrational rationality of capitalism. The answers of the Frankfurt School and the Freiburg School. ~ Nazism as necessary field of adversity to the definition of the neo-liberal objective. ~ The obstacles to liberal policy in Germany since the nineteenth century: (a) the protectionist economy according to List; (b) Bismarck's state socialism; (c) the setting up of a planned economy during the First World War; (d) Keynesian interventionism; (e) the economic policy of National Socialism. ~ The neo-liberal critique of National Socialism on the basis of these different elements of German history. ~ Theoretical consequences: extension of this critique to the New Deal and to the Beveridge plans; interventionism and the growth of the power of the state; massification and uniformization, effects of state control. ~ The stake of neo-liberalism: its novelty in comparison with classical liberalism. The theory of pure competition.</i></p> | |
| six | 14 February 1979 | 129 |
| | <p><i>German neo-liberalism (III). ~ Usefulness of historical analyses for the present. ~ How is neo-liberalism distinguished from classical liberalism? ~ Its specific stake: how to model the global exercise of political power on the principles of a market economy, and the transformations that derive from this. ~ The decoupling of the market economy and policies of laissez-faire. ~ The Walter Lippmann colloquium (26 to 30 August 1938). ~ The problem of the style of governmental action. Three examples: (a) the question of monopolies; (b) the question of "conformable actions (actions conformes)." The bases of economic policy according to W. Eucken. Regulatory actions and organizing actions (actions ordonnatrices); (c) social policy. The ordoliberal critique of the</i></p> | |

welfare economy. ~ Society as the point of application of governmental interventions. The “policy of society” (Gesellschaftspolitik). ~ First aspect of this policy: the formalization of society on the model of the enterprise. ~ Enterprise society and judicial society; two faces of a single phenomenon.

seven 21 February 1979 159

Second aspect of the “policy of society” according to the neo-liberals: the problem of law in a society regulated according to the model of the competitive market economy. ~ Return to the Walter Lippmann colloquium. ~ Reflections based on a text by Louis Rougier. ~ (1) The idea of a juridical-economic order. Reciprocity of relations between economic processes and institutional framework. ~ Political stake: the problem of the survival of capitalism. ~ Two complementary problems: the theory of competition and the historical and sociological analysis of capitalism. ~ (2) The question of legal interventionism. ~ Historical reminder: the Rule of law (l’État de droit) in the eighteenth century, in opposition to despotism and the police state. Re-elaboration of the notion in the nineteenth century: the question of arbitration between citizens and public authorities. The problem of administrative courts. ~ The neo-liberal project: to introduce the principles of the Rule of law into the economic order. ~ Rule of law and planning according to Hayek. ~ (3) Growth of judicial demand. ~ General conclusion: the specificity of the neo-liberal art of government in Germany. Ordoliberalism faced with the pessimism of Schumpeter.

eight 7 March 1979 185

General remarks: (1) The methodological scope of the analysis of micro-powers. (2) The inflationism of state phobia. Its links with ordoliberalism. ~ Two theses on the totalitarian state and the decline of state governmentality in the twentieth century. ~ Remarks on the spread of the German model, in France and in the United States. ~ The German neo-liberal model and the French project of a “social market economy.” ~ The French context of the transition to a neo-liberal economics. ~ French social policy: the example of

social security. ~ The separation of the economic and the social according to Giscard d'Estaing. ~ The project of a "negative tax" and its social and political stakes. "Relative" and "absolute" poverty. Abandonment of the policy of full employment.

nine

14 March 1979

215

American neo-liberalism (I). Its context. ~ The difference between American and European neo-liberalism. ~ American neo-liberalism as a global claim, utopian focus, and method of thought. ~ Aspects of this neo-liberalism: (1) The theory of human capital. The two processes that it represents: (a) an extension of economic analysis within its own domain: criticism of the classical analysis of labor in terms of the time factor; (b) an extension of economic analysis to domains previously considered to be non-economic. ~ The epistemological transformation produced by neo-liberal analysis: from the analysis of economic processes to the analysis of the internal rationality of human behavior. ~ Work as economic conduct. ~ Its division into capital, abilities, and income. ~ The redefinition of homo oeconomicus as entrepreneur of himself. ~ The notion of "human capital." Its constitutive elements: (a) innate elements and the question of the improvement of genetic human capital; (b) acquired elements and the problem of the formation of human capital (education, health, etcetera). ~ The interest of these analyses: resumption of the problem of social and economic innovation (Schumpeter). A new conception of the policy of growth.

ten

21 March 1979

239

American neo-liberalism (II). ~ The application of the economic grid to social phenomena. ~ Return to the ordoliberal problematic: the ambiguities of the Gesellschaftspolitik. The generalization of the "enterprise" form in the social field. Economic policy and Vitalpolitik: a society for the market and against the market. ~ The unlimited generalization of the economic form of the market in American neo-liberalism: principle of the intelligibility of individual behavior and critical principle of governmental interventions. ~ Aspects of American neo-liberalism: (2) Delinquency and penal

policy. ~ Historical reminder: the problem of the reform of penal law at the end of the eighteenth century. Economic calculation and principle of legality. The parasitic invasion of the law by the norm in the nineteenth century and the birth of criminal anthropology. ~ The neo-liberal analysis: (1) the definition of crime; (2) the description of the criminal subject as homo œconomicus; (3) the status of the penalty as instrument of law "enforcement." The example of the drugs market. ~ Consequences of this analysis: (a) anthropological erasure of the criminal; (b) putting the disciplinary model out of play.

eleven 28 March 1979 267

The model of homo œconomicus. ~ Its generalization to every form of behavior in American neo-liberalism. ~ Economic analysis and behavioral techniques. ~ Homo œconomicus as the basic element of the new governmental reason appeared in the eighteenth century. ~ Elements for a history of the notion of homo œconomicus before Walras and Pareto. ~ The subject of interest in English empiricist philosophy (Hume). ~ The heterogeneity of the subject of interest and the legal subject: (1) The irreducible nature of interest in comparison with juridical will. (2) The contrasting logics of the market and the contract. ~ Second innovation with regard to the juridical model: the economic subject's relationship with political power. Condorcet. Adam Smith's "invisible hand": invisibility of the link between the individual's pursuit of profit and the growth of collective wealth. The non-totalizable nature of the economic world. The sovereign's necessary ignorance. ~ Political economy as critique of governmental reason: rejection of the possibility of an economic sovereign in its two, mercantilist and physiocratic, forms. ~ Political economy as a science lateral to the art of government.

twelve 4 April 1979 291

Elements for a history of the notion of homo œconomicus (II). ~ Return to the problem of the limitation of sovereign power by economic activity. ~ The emergence of a new field, the correlate of the liberal art of government: civil society. ~ Homo œconomicus and

civil society: inseparable elements of liberal governmental technology. ~ Analysis of the notion of “civil society”: its evolution from Locke to Ferguson. Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1787). The four essential characteristics of civil society according to Ferguson: (1) it is an historical-natural constant; (2) it assures the spontaneous synthesis of individuals. Paradox of the economic bond; (3) it is a permanent matrix of political power; (4) it is the motor of history. ~ Appearance of a new system of political thought. ~ Theoretical consequences: (a) the question of the relations between state and society. The German, English, and French problematics; (b) the regulation of political power: from the wisdom of the prince to the rational calculations of the governed. ~ General conclusion.

Course Summary	317
Course Context	327
Index of Names	333
Index of Concepts and Notions	339



10 JANUARY 1979

Questions of method. ~ Suppose universals do not exist. ~ Summary of the previous year's lectures: the limited objective of the government of raison d'État (external politics) and unlimited objective of the police state (internal politics). ~ Law as principle of the external limitation of raison d'État. ~ Perspective of this year's lectures: political economy as principle of the internal limitation of governmental reason. ~ What is at stake in this research: the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth and the effects of its inscription in reality. ~ What is liberalism?

[YOU KNOW] FREUD'S QUOTATION: "*Acheronta movebo*."¹ Well, I would like to take the theme for this year's lectures from another, less well-known quotation from someone who, generally speaking at least, is also less well-known, the English Statesman Walpole,² who, with reference to his way of governing, said: "*Quieta non movere*,"³ "Let sleeping dogs lie."^{*} In a sense, this is the opposite of Freud. In fact, this year I would like to continue with what I began to talk about last year, that is to say, to retrace the history of what could be called the art of government. You recall the strict sense in which I understood "art of government," since in using the word "to govern" I left out the thousand and one different modalities and possible ways that exist for guiding men,

* Foucault gives the French translation of the Latin phrase as: "À ce qui reste tranquille il ne faut pas toucher" (or "Do not disturb what is at rest or settled")

directing their conduct, constraining their actions and reactions, and so on. Thus I left to one side all that is usually understood, and that for a long time was understood, as the government of children, of families, of a household, of souls, of communities, and so forth. I only considered, and again this year will only consider the government of men insofar as it appears as the exercise of political sovereignty.

So, “government” in the strict sense, but also “art,” “art of government” in the strict sense, since by “art of government” I did not mean the way in which governors really governed. I have not studied and do not want to study the development of real governmental practice by determining the particular situations it deals with, the problems raised, the tactics chosen, the instruments employed, forged, or remodeled, and so forth. I wanted to study the art of governing, that is to say, the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing. That is to say, I have tried to grasp the level of reflection in the practice of government and on the practice of government. In a sense, I wanted to study government’s consciousness of itself, if you like, although I don’t like the term “self-awareness (*conscience de soi*)” and will not use it, because I would rather say that I have tried, and would like to try again this year to grasp the way in which this practice that consists in governing was conceptualized both within and outside government, and anyway as close as possible to governmental practice. I would like to try to determine the way in which the domain of the practice of government, with its different objects, general rules, and overall objectives, was established so as to govern in the best possible way. In short, we could call this the study of the rationalization of governmental practice in the exercise of political sovereignty.

This immediately entails a choice of method that one day I will finally try to come back to at greater length, but I would like to point out straightaway that choosing to talk about or to start from governmental practice is obviously and explicitly a way of not taking as a primary, original, and already given object, notions such as the sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state, and civil society, that is to say, all those universals employed by sociological analysis, historical analysis, and political philosophy in order to account for real governmental practice. For my part, I would like to do exactly the opposite and, starting

from this practice as it is given, but at the same time as it reflects on itself and is rationalized, show how certain things—state and society, sovereign and subjects, etcetera—were actually able to be formed, and the status of which should obviously be questioned. In other words, instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices. This is not what could be called a historicist reduction, for that would consist precisely in starting from these universals as given and then seeing how history inflects them, or alters them, or finally invalidates them. Historicism starts from the universal and, as it were, puts it through the grinder of history. My problem is exactly the opposite. I start from the theoretical and methodological decision that consists in saying: Let's suppose that universals do not exist. And then I put the question to history and historians: How can you write history if you do not accept *a priori* the existence of things like the state, society, the sovereign, and subjects? It was the same question in the case of madness. My question was not: Does madness exist? My reasoning, my method, was not to examine whether history gives me or refers me to something like madness, and then to conclude, no, it does not, therefore madness does not exist. This was not the argument, the method in fact. The method consisted in saying: Let's suppose that madness does not exist. If we suppose that it does not exist, then what can history make of these different events and practices which are apparently organized around something that is supposed to be madness?⁴ So what I would like to deploy here is exactly the opposite of historicism: not, then, questioning universals by using history as a critical method, but starting from the decision that universals do not exist, asking what kind of history we can do. I will come back to this at greater length later.⁵

You recall that last year I tried to study one of those important episodes in the history of government. Roughly, this episode was that of the organization of what was called at the time *raison d'État*, in an infinitely stronger, stricter, more rigorous, and also fuller sense than was later given to this notion.⁶ I tried to locate the emergence of a particular type of rationality in governmental practice, a type of rationality that

would enable the way of governing to be modeled on something called the state which, in relation to this governmental practice, to this calculation of governmental practice, plays the role both of a given—since one only governs a state that is already there, one only governs within the framework of a state—but also, at the same time, as an objective to be constructed. The state is at once that which exists, but which does not yet exist enough. *Raison d'État* is precisely a practice, or rather the rationalization of a practice, which places itself between a state presented as given and a state presented as having to be constructed and built. The art of government must therefore fix its rules and rationalize its way of doing things by taking as its objective the bringing into being of what the state should be. What government has to do must be identified with what the state should be. Governmental *ratio* is what will enable a given state to arrive at its maximum being in a considered, reasoned, and calculated way. What is it to govern? To govern according to the principle of *raison d'État* is to arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent, so that it becomes wealthy, and so that it becomes strong in the face of everything that may destroy it.

A few words on what I tried to say last year, by way of a summary of last year's lectures. I would like to emphasize two or three points. First, you recall that the characteristic feature of this new governmental rationality of *raison d'État*, which was broadly formed during the sixteenth century, was that it defined the state and separated it out as both a specific and an autonomous, or relatively autonomous, reality. That is to say, government of the state must obviously respect a number of principles and rules which are above or dominate the state and are external to it. The government of the state must respect divine, moral, and natural laws as laws which are not homogeneous with or intrinsic to the state. But while respecting these laws, government has to do something other than ensure the salvation of its subjects in the hereafter, whereas in the Middle Ages the sovereign was commonly defined as someone who must help his subjects gain their salvation in the next world. Henceforth, government of the state no longer has to concern itself with the salvation of its subjects in the hereafter, at least not directly. It no longer has to extend its paternal benevolence over its subjects or establish father-child relationships with them, whereas in the Middle Ages the sovereign's

paternal role was always very emphatic and marked. In other words, the state is not a household, a church, or an empire. The state is a specific and discontinuous reality. The state exists only for itself and in relation to itself, whatever obedience it may owe to other systems like nature or God. The state only exists through and for itself, and it only exists in the plural. That is to say, there is nothing like an imperial structure which it has to merge with or submit to at a more or less distant point on the historical horizon and which would in some way represent God's theophany in the world, leading men to a finally united humanity on the threshold of the end of the world. So there is no integration of the state in the Empire. The state only exists as states, in the plural.

Specificity and plurality of the state. I tried to show you how this specific plurality of the state was embodied in a number of precise ways of governing with their correlative institutions. First, on the economic side, was mercantilism, that is to say, a form of government. Mercantilism is not an economic doctrine; it is something much more than and very different from an economic doctrine. It is a particular organization of production and commercial circuits according to the principle that: first, the state must enrich itself through monetary accumulation; second, it must strengthen itself by increasing population; and third, it must exist and maintain itself in a state of permanent competition with foreign powers. The second way for government according to *raison d'État* to organize and embody itself in a practice is internal management, that is to say, what at the time was called police, or the unlimited regulation of the country according to the model of a tight-knit urban organization. Finally, third, is the development of a permanent army along with a permanent diplomacy: the organization, if you like, of a permanent military-diplomatic apparatus with the objective of keeping the plurality of states free from imperial absorption in such a way that an equilibrium can be established between them without the production of imperial types of unification across Europe.

So, we have mercantilism with the police state and European balance: all of this was the concrete body of this new art of government organized in terms of the principle of *raison d'État*. These are three interdependent ways of governing in accordance with a rationality whose principle and domain of application is the state. I tried to show you through this that

the state is far from being a kind of natural-historical given which develops through its own dynamism like a “cold monster”⁷ whose seed having been sown at a given moment has gradually eaten away at history. The state is not a cold monster; it is the correlative of a particular way of governing. The problem is how this way of governing develops, what its history is, how it expands, how it contracts, how it is extended to a particular domain, and how it invents, forms, and develops new practices. This is the problem, and not making [the state]* a puppet show policeman overpowering the different figures of history.

Several comments on this subject. First of all, I think there is a distinctive feature of this art of government organized in terms of *raison d'État* which is important for understanding what comes after. This is that in its foreign policy, let's say in its relations with other states, the state, or rather government according to *raison d'État*, has a limited objective in comparison with the ultimate horizon, the project and desire of most sovereigns and governments in the Middle Ages to occupy the imperial position with regard to other states so that one will have a decisive role both in history and in the theophany. *Raison d'État*, on the other hand, accepts that every state has its interests and consequently has to defend these interests, and to defend them absolutely, but the state's objective must not be that of returning to the unifying position of a total and global empire at the end of time. It must not dream that one day it will be the empire of the last day. Each state must limit its objectives, ensure its independence, and ensure that its forces are such that it will never be in an inferior position with respect to the set of other countries, or to its neighbors, or to the strongest of all the other countries (there are different theories of European balance at this time, but that's not important here). In any case, this external self-limitation is the distinctive feature of *raison d'État* as it manifests itself in the formation of the military-diplomatic apparatuses of the seventeenth century. From the Treaty of Westphalia to the Seven Years War, or to the revolutionary wars that introduce a completely different dimension, military-diplomatic policy is organized by reference to the principle of the state's self-limitation, to the principle of the necessary and sufficient competition between different states.

* An evident slip. Foucault says: history

On the other hand, what is entailed by what we will now call internal policy, by the police state? Well, it entails precisely an objective or set of objectives that could be described as unlimited, since for those who govern in the police state it is not only a matter of taking into account and taking charge of the activity of groups and orders, that is to say, of different types of individuals with their particular status, but also of taking charge of activity at the most detailed, individual level. All the great seventeenth and eighteenth century treatises of police that collate and try to systematize the different regulations are in agreement on this and say explicitly: The object of police is almost infinite. That is to say, when it is a question of an independent power facing other powers, government according to *raison d'État* has limited objectives. But there is no limit to the objectives of government when it is a question of managing a public power that has to regulate the behavior of subjects. Competition between states is precisely the hinge connecting these limited and unlimited objectives, because it is precisely so as to be able to enter into competition with other states, that is to say, maintain an always uneven, competitive equilibrium with other states, that government [has to regulate the life of] its subjects, to regulate their economic activity, their production, the price [at which] they sell goods and the price at which they buy them, and so on [...]. The correlative of this limitation of the international objective of government according to *raison d'État*, of this limitation in international relations, is the absence of a limit in the exercise of government in the police state.

The second remark I would like to make about the functioning of *raison d'État* in the seventeenth century and at the start of the eighteenth century is that while there is no limit to the internal objectives of government according to *raison d'État*, or of the police state, this does not mean that there are no compensating mechanisms, or rather a number of positions that form the basis for trying to establish a boundary or frontier to the unlimited objective prescribed to the police state by *raison d'État*. There were, of course, a number of ways in which theology was called upon to fix limits to *raison d'État*, but what I would like to emphasize is another principle of limitation at this time, and this is law.

In actual fact, something curious took place. What fundamentally was the basis for the growth of royal power in the Middle Ages? It was, of

course, the army. The growth of royal power was also based on judicial institutions. It was as the keystone of a state of justice, of a system of justice, doubled by a military system, that the king gradually reduced the complex interplay of feudal powers. Throughout the Middle Ages, judicial practice was a multiplier of royal power. Now when this new governmental rationality develops in the sixteenth century, and especially from the start of the seventeenth century, law provides the basis for anyone who wants to limit in one way or another this indefinite extension of *raison d'État* that is becoming embodied in a police state. Legal theory and judicial institutions no longer serve as the multiplier, but rather as the subtractor of royal power. Thus, from the sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth century we see the development of a series of problems, polemics, and battles around, for example, fundamental laws of the realm that jurists argue, against *raison d'État*, cannot be called into question by governmental practice or *raison d'État*. These fundamental laws exist, as it were, before the state, since they are constitutive of the state, and so, some jurists say, the king, however absolute his power, must not tamper with them. The law constituted by these fundamental laws thus appeared to be outside *raison d'État* and a principle of its limitation.

There is also the theory of natural law and the assertion of imprescriptible natural rights that a sovereign may not transgress under any circumstances. Then there is the theory of the contract that individuals enter into in order to constitute a sovereign and which contains clauses to which he must abide, since it is precisely on completion of this contract, and of the clauses formulated in it, that the sovereign becomes sovereign. In England, more than in France, there is the theory of an agreement established between sovereign and subjects in order to constitute a state and on completion of which the sovereign is committed to doing some things and not others. There is also a whole part of this historical-juridical reflection, which I spoke about two or three years ago, I no longer remember when exactly,⁸ in which there was the historical claim that for a long time royal power was far from having been an absolute government, that the reason that reigned and was established between the sovereign and his subjects was not at all *raison d'État*, but was rather a sort of transaction between, for example, the nobility and the military leader whom they had charged with the functions of

military chief during, and maybe for a short while after, a period of war. The king would be the outcome of this kind of situation of original law, later abusing this situation in order to overturn these historically original laws that must now be rediscovered.

Anyway, these discussions of law, their liveliness, and what's more the development of all the problems and theories of what could be called public law, the reappearance of the themes of natural law, original law, the contract, and so forth, which were formulated in the Middle Ages in a completely different context, are all in a way the other side and consequence, and the reaction against, this new way of governing on the basis of *raison d'État*. In fact, law and the judicial institutions intrinsic to the development of royal power now become, as it were, external and excessive in relation to government exercised according to *raison d'État*. It is not surprising that all these problems of law are always formulated, in the first place at least, by those opposed to the new system of *raison d'État*. In France, for example, it is members of the *parlements*, protestants, and the nobility who take up the historical-juridical aspect. In England it is the bourgeoisie against the absolute monarchy of the Stuarts, and religious dissidents from the start of the seventeenth century. In short, the opposition always makes a legal objection to *raison d'État* and consequently uses juridical reflection, legal rules, and legal authority against it. In a word, let's say that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries public law is oppositional,* although it is true that some theorists favorable towards royal power took up the problem and tried to integrate questions of law, legal questioning, within *raison d'État* and its justification. Anyway, I think we should keep it in mind that even if it is true that *raison d'État* formulated and manifested as the police state, embodied in the police state, has unlimited objectives, it is also the case that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there are constant attempts to limit *raison d'État*, and the principle or reason of this limitation is found in juridical reason. But you can see that it is an external limitation. Moreover, the jurists are fully aware that their question of law is extrinsic to *raison d'État* insofar as this is precisely that which exceeds the legal domain.

* The manuscript clarifies, p. 10: "(except in the German states, which had to be legally founded against the Empire)."

External legal limits to the state, to *raison d'État*, means first of all that the limits one tries to impose on *raison d'État* are those that come from God, or those which were laid down once and for all at the origin, or those which were formulated in the distant past of history. Saying that they are extrinsic to *raison d'État* also means that they function in a purely restrictive, dramatic way, since basically the law will only object to *raison d'État* when the latter crosses these legal limits, at which point the law will be able to define the government as illegitimate, to argue against its encroachments, and if necessary to release subjects from their duty of obedience.

Broadly speaking, this is how I tried to describe this way of governing called *raison d'État*. I would now like to place myself around the middle of the eighteenth century—with the qualification that I will talk about in a moment—when Walpole said: “*quieta non movere*” (“let sleeping dogs lie”). I think it is around this time that we are forced to note an important transformation that in a general way will be a characteristic feature of what could be called modern governmental reason. In what does this transformation consist? Well, in a word, it consists in establishing a principle of limitation that will no longer be extrinsic to the art of government, as was law in the seventeenth century, [but] intrinsic to it: an internal regulation of governmental rationality. What is this internal regulation in abstract and general terms? How can it be understood before any precise and concrete historical form? What can an internal limitation of governmental rationality be?

In the first place, it will be a *de facto* regulation, a *de facto* limitation. That is to say, it will not be a legal limitation, although at some point the law will have to transcribe it in the form of rules which must not be infringed. At any rate, to say that it is a *de facto* limitation means that if the government happens to push aside this limitation and go beyond the bounds laid down for it, it will not thereby be illegitimate, it will not have abandoned its own essence as it were, and it will not be deprived of its basic rights. To say that there is a *de facto* limitation of governmental practice means that a government that ignores this limitation will not be an illegitimate, usurping government, but simply a clumsy, inadequate government that does not do the proper thing.

Second, intrinsic limitation of the art of government means that, while being a *de facto* limitation, it is nonetheless general. That is to say, it is not

simply a question of sorts of recommendations of prudence which point out that in a particular circumstance it would be better not to do something, that in this or that circumstance it would be better to refrain from intervention. No. Internal regulation means that there really is a limitation that is general while being *de facto*, that is to say, that, whatever happens, follows a relatively uniform line in terms of principles valid at all times and in all circumstances. The problem is precisely one of defining this general and *de facto* limit that government will have to impose on itself.

Third, internal limitation means that in looking for the principle of this limitation, because we need to know what this generality depends on, we will not seek it in the natural rights prescribed by God to all men, for example, or in revealed Scripture, or even in the wills of subjects who at a given moment agree to enter into society. No, the principle of this limitation is not to be sought in what is external to government, but in what is internal to governmental practice, that is to say, in the objectives of government. And this limitation will then appear as one of the means, and maybe the fundamental means, of attaining precisely these objectives. To attain these objectives it may be necessary to limit governmental action. Governmental reason does not have to respect these limits because they are limits laid down once and for all somewhere outside, before, or around the state. Not at all. Governmental reason will have to respect these limits inasmuch as it can calculate them on its own account in terms of its objectives and [the] best means of achieving them.

Fourth, this *de facto*, general limitation, which is effectuated in terms of governmental practice itself, will establish, of course, a division between what must be done and what it is advisable not to do. It will mark out the limit of a governmental action, but this will not be drawn in the subjects, the individuals-subjects directed by government. That is to say, one will not try to determine a division within subjects between one part that is subject to governmental action, and another that is definitively, once and for all, reserved for freedom. In other words, this governmental reason does not divide subjects between an absolutely reserved dimension of freedom and another dimension of submission which is either consented to or imposed. In fact, the division is not made within individuals, men, or subjects, but in the very domain of governmental practice, or rather within governmental practice itself, between the

operations that can be carried out and those that cannot, between what to do and the means to use on the one hand, and what not to do on the other. The problem, therefore, is not: Where are the basic rights, and how do they separate the domain of fundamental freedom from the domain of possible governmentality? The dividing line is established between two sets of things that Bentham listed in one of his most important texts (to which I will try to return):⁹ the division between the *agenda* and the *non-agenda*, between what to do and what not to do.

Fifth, this limitation is therefore a *de facto*, general limitation, a limitation in terms of the objectives of government that does not divide the subjects but the things to be done, and it is not those who govern who, in complete sovereignty and full reason, will decide on this internal limitation.* Inasmuch as the government of men is a practice which is not imposed by those who govern on those who are governed, but a practice that fixes the definition and respective positions of the governed and governors facing each other and in relation to each other, “internal regulation” means that this limitation is not exactly imposed by either one side or the other, or at any rate not globally, definitively, and totally, but by, I would say, transaction, in the very broad sense of the word, that is to say, “action between,” that is to say, by a series of conflicts, agreements, discussions, and reciprocal concessions: all episodes whose effect is finally to establish a *de facto*, general, rational division between what is to be done and what is not to be done in the practice of governing.

In a word, the principle of right—whether historically or theoretically defined doesn’t matter here—previously confronted the sovereign and what he could do with a certain limit: You will not step over this line, you will not infringe this right, and you will not violate this basic freedom. At this time the principle of right balanced *raison d’État* with an external principle. Let’s say that now we enter—you can see it quite clearly—an age of critical governmental reason. You can see that this critical governmental reason, or internal criticism of governmental reason, no longer revolves around the question of right and the question of the sovereign’s usurpation or legitimacy. It will no longer have that kind of penal appearance that public law still had in the sixteenth and seventeenth

* M.F.: will decide themselves on what is to be done and what is not to be done.

centuries when it said: If the sovereign breaks this law, then he must be punished by a sanction of illegitimacy. The whole question of critical governmental reason will turn on how not to govern too much.¹⁰ The objection is no longer to the abuse of sovereignty but to excessive government. And it is by reference to excessive government, or at any rate to the delimitation of what would be excessive for a government, that it will be possible to gauge the rationality of governmental practice.

Before giving this abstract description, I said that this fundamental transformation in the relations between law and governmental practice, this emergence of an internal limitation of governmental reason could be located roughly around the middle of the eighteenth century. What permitted its emergence? How did it come about? Obviously, we should take into account an entire, comprehensive transformation (I will come back to this, at least partially, afterwards), but today I would just like to indicate the intellectual instrument, the form of calculation and rationality that made possible the self-limitation of governmental reason as a *de facto*, general self-regulation which is intrinsic to the operations of government and can be the object of indefinite transactions. Well, once again, the intellectual instrument, the type of calculation or form of rationality that made possible the self-limitation of governmental reason was not the law. What is it, starting from the middle of the eighteenth century? Obviously, it is political economy.

The very ambiguities of the term “political economy,” and of its meaning at this time, indicate what was basically at issue in all this, since you know that between 1750 and 1810-1820 the expression “political economy” oscillates between two semantic poles. Sometimes this expression aims at a particular strict and limited analysis of the production and circulation of wealth. But, in a broader and more practical sense, “political economy” also refers to any method of government that can procure the nation’s prosperity. And finally, political economy—the term employed by Rousseau in his famous article in the *Encyclopedie*¹¹—is a sort of general reflection on the organization, distribution, and limitation of powers in a society. I think that fundamentally it was political economy that made it possible to ensure the self-limitation of governmental reason.

Why and how did political economy make this possible? Here again—I will go into a bit more detail later—I would just like to indicate

some points which I think are indispensable for understanding the set of things I want to talk about this year. First, unlike sixteenth and seventeenth century juridical thought, political economy was not developed outside *raison d'État*. It was not developed against *raison d'État* and in order to limit it, at least not in the first place. Rather, it was formed within the very framework of the objectives set for the art of government by *raison d'État*, for what objectives did political economy set itself? Well, it set itself the objective of the state's enrichment. Its objective was the simultaneous, correlative, and suitably adjusted growth of population on the one hand, and means of subsistence on the other. Political economy offered to ensure suitable, adjusted, and always favorable competition between states. It proposed precisely the maintenance of an equilibrium between states such that competition can take place. That is to say, it took up exactly the objectives of *raison d'État* and the police state that mercantilism and the European balance had tried to realize. So, to start with, political economy lodges itself within the governmental reason of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and to that extent is not in the kind of external position occupied by juridical thought.

Second, political economy does not put itself forward as an external objection to *raison d'État* and its political autonomy since—and this will be an historically important point—the first political consequence of the first economic reflection to exist in the history of European thought is precisely a consequence which goes completely against what the jurists were after and concludes that total despotism is necessary. The first political economy was, of course, that of the physiocrats, and you know that from the very start of their economic analysis the physiocrats—I will come back to this—concluded that political power must be a power without external limitation, without external counterbalance, and without any bounds other than those arising from itself, and this is what they called despotism.¹² Despotism is an economic government, but an economic government which is not hemmed in and whose boundaries are not drawn by anything but an economy which it has itself defined and which it completely controls. It is a matter of absolute despotism and so you can see that in that respect political economy does not reverse the tendency marked out by *raison d'État*, at least not at first or at that level, and political economy can appear to be in a direct line of descent from a *raison d'État* that gave the monarch total and absolute power.

Third, on what does political economy reflect, what does it analyze? It is not something like prior rights inscribed in human nature or in the history of a given society. Political economy reflects on governmental practices themselves, and it does not question them to determine whether or not they are legitimate in terms of right. It considers them in terms of their effects rather than their origins, not by asking, for example, what authorizes a sovereign to raise taxes, but by asking, quite simply: What will happen if, at a given moment, we raise a tax on a particular category of persons or a particular category of goods? What matters is not whether or not this is legitimate in terms of law, but what its effects are and whether they are negative. It is then that the tax in question will be said to be illegitimate or, at any rate, to have no *raison d'être*. The economic question is always to be posed within the field of governmental practice, not in terms of what may found it by right, but in terms of its effects: What are the real effects of the exercise of governmentality? Not: What original rights can found this governmentality? This is the third reason why political economy, in its reflection and its new rationality, was able to find a place, if you like, within the governmental practice and reason established in the previous epoch.

The fourth reason is that, in responding to this type of question, political economy revealed the existence of phenomena, processes, and regularities that necessarily occur as a result of intelligible mechanisms. These intelligible and necessary mechanisms may, of course, be impeded by the practices of some forms of governmentality. They may be impeded, jammed, or obscured, but they cannot be avoided and it will not be possible to suspend them totally and definitively. In any case, they will force a reappraisal of governmental practice. In other words, political economy does not discover natural rights that exist prior to the exercise of governmentality; it discovers a certain naturalness specific to the practice of government itself. The objects of governmental action have a specific nature. There is a nature specific to this governmental action itself and this is what political economy will study. The notion* of nature will thus be transformed with the appearance of political economy. For political economy, nature is not an original and reserved region on which the exercise of power should not impinge, on pain of being illegitimate.

* Foucault adds: natural and

Nature is something that runs under, through, and in the exercise of governmentality. It is, if you like, its indispensable hypodermis. It is the other face of something whose visible face, visible for the governors, is their own action. Their action has an underside, or rather, it has another face, and this other face of governmentality, its specific necessity, is precisely what political economy studies. It is not background, but a permanent correlative. Thus, the *économistes* explain, the movement of population to where wages are highest, for example, is a law of nature; it is a law of nature that customs duty protecting the high price of the means of subsistence will inevitably entail something like dearth.

Finally, the last point explaining how and why political economy was able to appear as the first form of this new self-limiting governmental *ratio* is that if there is a nature specific to the objects and operations of governmentality, then the consequence of this is that governmental practice can only do what it has to do by respecting this nature. If it were to disrupt this nature, if it were not to take it into account or go against laws determined by this naturalness specific to the objects it deals with, it would immediately suffer negative consequences. In other words, there will be either success or failure; success or failure, rather than legitimacy or illegitimacy, now become the criteria of governmental action. So, success replaces [legitimacy].* We touch here on the whole problem of utilitarian philosophy, which we will have to talk about. You can see how utilitarian philosophy will be able to plug directly into these new problems of governmentality. This is not important for the moment; we will come back to it.

Success or failure, then, will replace the division between legitimacy and illegitimacy—but there is more. What makes a government, despite its objectives, disrupt the naturalness specific to the objects it deals with and the operations it carries out? What will lead it to violate this nature despite the success it seeks? Violence, excess, and abuse? Maybe, but ultimately these are not merely or fundamentally a matter of the wickedness of the prince. What is at issue, what explains this, is precisely that when a government violates these laws of nature, it quite simply ignores them. It ignores them because it is unaware of their existence, mechanisms,

* M.F.: failure

and effects. In other words, governments can be mistaken. And the greatest evil of government, what makes it a bad government, is not that the prince is wicked, but that he is ignorant. In short, through political economy there is the simultaneous entry into the art of government of, first, the possibility of self-limitation, that is, of governmental action limiting itself by reference to the nature of what it does and of that on which it is brought to bear, [and second, the question of truth].* The possibility of limitation and the question of truth are both introduced into governmental reason through political economy.

You will tell me that this is certainly not the first time that the question of truth and the question of the self-limitation of governmental practice are raised. After all, what was traditionally understood by the prince's wisdom? The prince's wisdom told him: I know God's laws too well, I know human weakness too well, and I know my own limits too well not to restrain my power and fail to respect my subject's right. But we can see that the relationship between the principle of truth and the principle of self-limitation in the prince's wisdom is completely different from their relationship in the emerging governmental practice that is anxious to know the natural consequences of its actions in the objects it deals with and manipulates. The prudent counselors who previously fixed limits of wisdom to the prince's presumption no longer have anything to do with these new economic experts whose task is to tell the government what in truth the natural mechanisms are of what it is manipulating.

So, with political economy we enter an age whose principle could be this: A government is never sufficiently aware that it always risks governing too much, or, a government never knows too well how to govern just enough. The principle of maximum/minimum replaces the notion of equitable equilibrium, of "equitable justice" that previously organized the prince's wisdom. With this question of self-limitation by the principle of truth, I think political economy introduced a formidable wedge into the unlimited presumption of the police state. This is evidently a crucial moment since it establishes, in its most important features, not

* Unfinished sentence. Manuscript p. 20: "In short, through political economy there is the simultaneous entry into the art of government of the possibility of self-limitation and the question of truth."

of course the reign of truth in politics, but a particular regime of truth which is a characteristic feature of what could be called the age of politics and the basic apparatus of which is in fact still the same today. When I say regime of truth I do not mean that at this moment politics or the art of government finally becomes rational. I do not mean that at this moment a sort of epistemological threshold is reached on the basis of which the art of government could become scientific. I mean that the moment I am presently trying to indicate is marked by the articulation of a particular type of discourse and a set of practices, a discourse that, on the one hand, constitutes these practices as a set bound together by an intelligible connection and, on the other hand, legislates and can legislate on these practices in terms of true and false.

In concrete terms this means the following. Basically, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and even before, until the middle of the eighteenth century, there was a whole set of practices of tax levies, customs charges, manufacture regulations, regulations of grain prices, the protection and codification of market practices, and so on. But what were these practices, and how were they thought about? Well, all of this was conceived of as the exercise of sovereign rights, of feudal rights, as the maintenance of customs, as effective procedures of enrichment for the Treasury, or as techniques for preventing urban revolt due to the discontent of this or that group of subjects. In short, all of these practices were certainly reflected on, but on the basis of different events and principles of rationalization. From the middle of the eighteenth century it becomes possible to establish a reasoned, reflected coherence between these different practices going from customs charges to tax levies, to the regulation of the market and production, and so on; a coherence established by intelligible mechanisms which link together these different practices and their effects, and which consequently allows one to judge all these practices as good or bad, not in terms of a law or moral principle, but in terms of propositions subject to the division between true and false. Thus, in this way a whole section of governmental activity enters into a new regime of truth with the fundamental effect of reconfiguring all the questions formerly posed by the art of governing. At one time these amounted to the question: Am I governing in proper conformity to moral, natural, or divine laws? Then,

in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with *raison d'État*, it was: Am I governing with sufficient intensity, depth, and attention to detail so as to bring the state to the point fixed by what it should be, to bring it to its maximum strength? And now the problem will be: Am I governing at the border between the too much and too little, between the maximum and minimum fixed for me by the nature of things—I mean, by the necessities intrinsic to the operations of government? The emergence of this regime of truth as the principle of the self-limitation of government is the object I would like to deal with this year.

The question here is the same as the question I addressed with regard to madness, disease, delinquency, and sexuality. In all of these cases, it was not a question of showing how these objects were for a long time hidden before finally being discovered, nor of showing how all these objects are only wicked illusions or ideological products to be dispelled in the [light]* of reason finally having reached its zenith. It was a matter of showing by what conjunctions a whole set of practices—from the moment they become coordinated with a regime of truth—was able to make what does not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, etcetera), nonetheless become something, something however that continues not to exist. That is to say, what I would like to show is not how an error—when I say that which does not exist becomes something, this does not mean showing how it was possible for an error to be constructed—or how an illusion could be born, but how a particular regime of truth, and therefore not an error, makes something that does not exist able to become something. It is not an illusion since it is precisely a set of practices, real practices, which established it and thus imperiously marks it out in reality.

The point of all these investigations concerning madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, and what I am talking about now, is to show how the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus (*dispositif*) of knowledge-power that effectively marks out in reality that which does not exist and legitimately submits it to the division between true and false.

* A clear slip. M.F.: mist

In the things I am presently concerned with, the moment when that which does not exist is inscribed in reality, and when that which does not exist comes under a legitimate regime of the true and false, marks the birth of this dissymmetrical bipolarity of politics and the economy. Politics and the economy are not things that exist, or errors, or illusions, or ideologies. They are things that do not exist and yet which are inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and the false.

This moment, whose main components I have tried to indicate, is situated between Walpole, whom I have talked about, and another text. Walpole said: “*quieta non movere*” (“let sleeping dogs lie”). This is no doubt a counsel of prudence, and we are still in the realm of the wisdom of the prince, that is to say: When the people are peaceful, when they are not agitating and there is no discontent or revolt, stay calm. So, wisdom of the prince. I think he said this around the 1740s. In 1751 an anonymous article appeared in the *Journal économique*. It was in fact written by the marquis d’Argenson,¹³ who, had just given up his official activities. Recalling what the merchant Le Gendre said to Colbert—when Colbert asked him: “What can I do for you?” Le Gendre replied: “What can you do for us? Leave us alone (*Laissez-nous faire*)”¹⁴—in this text to which I will come back,¹⁵ d’Argenson says that what he would like to do is comment on this principle of “*laissez-nous faire*,”¹⁶ because, he shows, in economic matters this really is the essential principle which all governments must respect and follow.¹⁷ At this moment he has laid down clearly the principle of the self-limitation of governmental reason. But what does “the self-limitation of governmental reason” mean? What is this new type of rationality in the art of government, this new type of calculation that consists in saying and telling government: I accept, wish, plan, and calculate that all this should be left alone? I think that this is broadly what is called “liberalism.”*

* In inverted commas in the manuscript. Foucault does not read the last pages of the manuscript (pp. 25-32). Elements of this conclusion are taken up and developed in the next lecture.

“The word [‘liberalism’] should be understood very broadly.

1. Acceptance of the principle that somewhere there must be a limitation of government and that this is not just an external right.

2. Liberalism is also a practice: where exactly is the principle of the limitation of government to be found and how are the effects of this limitation to be calculated?

I thought I could do a course on biopolitics this year. I will try to show how the central core of all the problems that I am presently trying to identify is what is called population. Consequently, this is the basis on which something like biopolitics could be formed. But it seems to me that the analysis of biopolitics can only get under way when we

3. In a narrower sense, liberalism is the solution that consists in the maximum limitation of the forms and domains of government action.

4. Finally, liberalism is the organization of specific methods of transaction for defining the limitation of government practices:

- constitution, parliament
- opinion, the press
- commissions, inquiries

[p. 27] One of the forms of modern governmentality. A characteristic feature is the fact that instead of coming up against limits formalized by jurisdictions, it [gives?] itself intrinsic limits formulated in terms of veridiction.

a. Of course, there are not two systems, one after the other, or in insuperable conflict with each other. Heterogeneity does not mean contradiction, but tensions, frictions, mutual incompatibilities, successful or failed adjustments, unstable mixtures, and so on. It also means a constantly resumed because never completed task of establishing either a coincidence or at least a common regime. This task is that of giving a legal form to the self-limitation that knowledge (*le savoir*) prescribes to government.

[p. 28] From the eighteenth [century] to the present, this task will take two forms:

—Either, questioning governmental reason, and the necessity of its limitation, in order to identify, through what must be left free, what rights can be recognized and given status within governmental practice. Thus, questioning the objectives, ways, and means of an enlightened and so self-limited government can give rise to the right to property, to possible means of subsistence, to work, etcetera.

—Or, questioning the basic rights, asserting them all and at once. And, on this basis, only allowing a government to be formed on condition that its self-regulation reproduces all of them. Method [crossed out: revolutionary] of governmental subordination.

[p. 29] Liberal practice adopts the method of the necessary and sufficient juridical remainder. Revolutionary procedure adopts the method of exhaustive governmental conditions.

b. Second comment: this self-limitation of governmental reason characteristic of 'liberalism' has a strange relationship with the regime of *raison d'État*.—The latter opens up an unlimited domain of intervention to governmental practice, but on the other hand, through the principle of a competitive balance between states, it gives itself limited international objectives.

—The self-limitation of governmental practice by liberal reason is accompanied by the break-up of these international objectives and the appearance of unlimited objectives with imperialism.

[p. 30] *Raison d'État* was correlative with the disappearance of the imperial principle and its replacement by competitive equilibrium between states. Liberal reason is correlative with activation of the imperial principle, not in the form of the Empire, but in the form of imperialism, and this in connection with the principle of the free competition between individuals and enterprises.

Chiasmus between limited and unlimited objectives with regard to the domain of internal intervention and the field of international action.

c. Third comment: liberal reason is established as self-limitation of government on the basis of a 'naturalness' of the objects and practices specific to government. What is this naturalness?

have understood the general regime of this governmental reason I have talked about, this general regime that we can call the question of truth, of economic truth in the first place, within governmental reason. Consequently, it seems to me that it is only when we understand what is at stake in this regime of liberalism opposed to *raison d'État*—or rather, fundamentally modifying [it] without, perhaps, questioning its bases—only when we know what this governmental regime called liberalism was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is.

So, forgive me, for some weeks—I cannot say in advance how many—I will talk about liberalism. In this way, it may become a bit clearer what is at stake in this—for, after all, what interest is there in talking about liberalism, the physiocrats, d'Argenson, Adam Smith, Bentham, and the English utilitarians, if not because the problem of liberalism arises for us in our immediate and concrete actuality? What does it mean when we speak of liberalism when we apply a liberal politics to ourselves, today, and what relationship may there be between this and those questions of right that we call freedoms or liberties? What is going on in all this, in today's debate in which Helmut Schmidt's¹⁸ economic principles bizarrely echo the voice of dissidents in the East, in this problem of liberty, of liberalism? Fine, it is a problem of our times. So, if you like, after having situated the historical point of origin of all this by bringing out what, according to me, is the new governmental reason from the eighteenth century, I will jump ahead and talk about contemporary German liberalism since, however paradoxical it may seem, liberty in the second half of the twentieth century, well let's say more accurately, liberalism, is a word that comes to us from Germany.

—Naturalness of wealth? Yes, but only as increasing or diminishing, stagnant or [p. 31] circulating means of payment. But goods rather insofar as they are produced, are useful and utilized, insofar as they are exchanged between economic partners.

—It is also the naturalness of individuals. Not, however, as obedient or intractable subjects, but insofar as they are themselves linked to this economic naturalness, insofar as their longevity, health, and ways of conducting themselves have complex and tangled relationships with these economic processes.

With the emergence of political economy, with the introduction of the restrictive principle in governmental practice itself, an important substitution, or doubling rather, is carried out, since the subjects of right on which political sovereignty is exercised appear as a *population* that a government must manage.

[p. 32] This is the point of departure for the organizational line of a 'biopolitics.' But who does not see that this is only part of something much larger, which [is] this new governmental reason? Studying liberalism as the general framework of biopolitics."

1. Quotation from Virgil, *Aeneid*, VIII, 312, placed as an epigraph of the *Tramdeutung* (Leipzig: Deuticke, 1911); English translation by James Strachey, *The Interpretation of Dreams in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1958) vol. IV (First Part) p. ix, and repeated in the text (vol. V, Second Part, p. 608, fn. 1): "*Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo*" where it is translated as: "If I cannot bend the Higher Powers, I will move the Infernal Regions" [or more colloquially, "I will raise hell"; G.B.]. The phrase was quoted by Foucault, without explicit reference to Freud, in *La Volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976) p. 103; English translation by Robert Hurley as *The History of Sexuality, Vol. One: An Introduction* (New York: Pantheon, 1978; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984) p. 79: "In reality, this question so often repeated nowadays, is but the recent form of a considerable affirmation and a secular prescription: there is where the truth is; go see if you can uncover it. *Acheronta movebo*: an age-old decision." Before Freud, this quotation was already much appreciated by Bismarck, who used it several times in his *Pensées et Souvenirs*. See C. Schmitt, *Théorie des Partisanen* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1963); French translation by M.L. Steinhäuser, *Théorie du partisan* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1972) p. 253.
2. Robert Walpole, 1st Earl of Orford (1676-1745), Whig leader who, as first Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1720 to 1742, was effectively Britain's first Prime Minister; he governed pragmatically, using Parliamentary corruption, with the aim of preserving political peace.
3. See Foucault's clarification on p. 20: "I think he said it around the 1740s." The formula is known for being Walpole's motto, as evidenced by various writings of his son Horace; see, for example, *Letters*, VIII (London and New York: Lawrence and Bullen; G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1903) p. 121. See L. Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Smith and Elder, 1902; reprint: Bristol: Thoemmes Antiquarian Books, 1991) vol. 2, p. 168. The phrase comes from Sallust, *De Conjuración Catilinae*, 21, 1: "Postquam accipere ea homines, quibus mala abunde monia erant, sed neque res neque spes bona ulla, tametsi illis *quieta movere* magna merces videbatur (...)"; French translation by F. Richard, *Conjuración de Catilina* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1968) p. 43; English translation by A.W. Pollard, *The Catiline of Sallust* (London: Macmillan, 1928), p. 19: "These words were listened to by men who had every evil in abundances, but no good fortune, nor any hope of it. Great, however, as the wages of revolution appeared to them ..."; and by J.C. Rolfe, "The War with Catiline" in *Sallust* (London and Cambridge Mass.: William Heinemann/Harvard University Press, The Loeb Classical Library, 1947) p. 39: "When these words fell upon the ears of men who had misfortune of every kind in excess, but neither means nor any honourable hope, although disorder alone seemed to them an ample reward ..." It illustrates the rule of precedent in English Common Law, according to which, in judicial matters one must keep to what has been decided and not modify what exists ("*stare decisis*" and "*quieta non movere*"). It is also cited by F. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, (1960) 1976) p. 410: "Though *quieta non movere* may at times be a wise maxim for the Statesman, it cannot satisfy the political philosopher."
4. See Paul Veyne, "Foucault révolutionne l'histoire" (1978), in Paul Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire* (Paris: Le Seuil, "Points Histoire," 1979) pp. 227-230; English translation by Catherine Porter, "Foucault Revolutionizes History" in Arnold I. Davidson, ed., *Foucault and his Interlocutors* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997) pp. 167-170, on methodological nominalism with regard to the phrase "madness does not exist." In view of the fact that Veyne's text dates from 1978, it would seem that Foucault is here pursuing his dialogue with the author of *Le Pain et le Cirque*, to which he paid tribute in the previous year's lectures (see *Sécurité, Territoire, Population. Cours au Collège de France, 1977-1978*, ed. Michel Senellart (Paris: Gallimard-Le Seuil, 2004); English translation by Graham Burchell, *Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*, English series ed. Arnold I. Davidson (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), lecture of 8 March 1978, p. 239. See also Foucault's comments on the same theme in the lecture of 8 February 1978, p. 118. The criticism of universals is also reaffirmed in the article "Foucault" which appeared in 1984 in the *Dictionnaire des philosophes* of

Denis Huismans, under the pseudonym Maurice Florens. See, M. Foucault, "Foucault" in *Dits et Écrits, 1954-1988*, four volumes, eds. D. Defert and F. Ewald, with the collaboration of J. Lagrange (Paris: Gallimard, 1994) vol. 4, p. 634; English translation by Robert Hurley, in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, volume 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley and others (New York: The New Press, 1998) p. 461: the first choice of method entailed by "the question of the relations between the subject and truth" was "a systematic skepticism toward all anthropological universals."

5. Foucault does not return to this question in the following lectures.
6. See *Sécurité, Territoire, Population; Security, Territory, Population*, lectures of 8, 15, and 22 March 1978.
7. See *ibid.* lecture of 1 February 1978; (Eng.) *ibid.* p. 109 and note 39.
8. See, "Il faut défendre la société." *Cours au Collège de France, 1975-1976*, eds. M. Bertani and A. Fontana (Paris: Gallimard-Le Seuil, 1997); English translation by David Macey, "Society Must be Defended," *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976*, English series ed. Arnold I. Davidson (New York: Picador, 2003).
9. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), *Method and Leading Features of an Institute of Political Economy (including finance) considered not only as a science but as an art (1800-1804)*, in *Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings*, ed. W. Stark (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954) vol. 3, pp. 305-380. It is at the end of the first part, "The Science," in the section on "Genesis of the Matter of Wealth," that Bentham introduces the famous distinction between *sponte acta*, *agenda* and *non-agenda*, which structures the three chapters ("Wealth," "Population," and "Finance") of the following part, "The Art." The *sponte acta* are economic activities spontaneously developed by members of a community without any governmental intervention. The *agenda* and *non-agenda* designate the economic activities of government according to whether or not they increase happiness (the maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain), which is the aim of all political action. The division of the domains between these three classes varies according to time and place, the extension of the *sponte acta* being relative to a country's level of economic development. Foucault makes another brief reference to Bentham's list of the *agenda* in the lecture of 7 March 1979 (see below p. 195), but strictly speaking he does not speak again of the text cited (except, perhaps, indirectly at the end of the lecture of 24 January (below p. 67), with regard to the panopticon as a general formula of liberal government).
10. The formula "do not govern too much (*pas trop gouverner*)" is from the marquis d'Argenson (see below, note 16). See also, B. Franklin, *Principles of Trade* (London: Brotherton and Sewell, 1774, 2nd edition) p. 34: "It is said, by a very solid Writer of the same Nation, that he is well advanced in the Science of Politics, who knows the full Force of that Maxim *Pas trop gouverner*: Not to govern too strictly." [In same section, pp. 33-34 there is following: "When Colbert assembled some wise old Merchants of France; and desired their Advice and Opinion, how he could best serve and promote Commerce; their answer, after Consultation, was, in three Words only, *Laissez nous faire*. Let us alone."]
11. This article was printed for the first time in volume 5 of the *Encyclopédie* pp. 337-349, which appeared in November 1755. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Économie politique," in *Œuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964) vol. III, pp. 241-278; English translation by G.D.H. Cole, *A Discourse on Political Economy*, in *The Social Contract and Discourses* (London: J.M. Dent, 1993). On this text, see *Sécurité, Territoire, Population; Security, Territory, Population*, lecture of 1 February 1978, p. 95 and note 21.
12. See P.P.F.J.H. Le Mercier de La Rivière, *L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques* (published without the author's name, London: Jean Nourse, and Paris: Desaint, 1767) ch. 24: "Du despotisme legal." The text was republished twice in the twentieth century: (i) Paris: P. Geuthner, "Collection des économistes et des réformateurs sociaux de la France," 1910, and (ii) Paris: Fayard, "Corpus des œuvres de philosophie en langue française," 2000.
13. René-Louis de Voyer, marquis d'Argenson (1694-1757), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1744 to 1747, the author of *Mémoires et Journal*, published and annotated by the Marquis d'Argenson, Paris, 1858 (a first, very incomplete edition appeared in 1835 in the Baudouin collection of "Mémoires sur la Révolution française") and of *Considérations sur le gouvernement ancien et présent de la France* (Amsterdam: Rey, 1764). With the abbot de Saint-Pierre, he was one of the assiduous members of the Club de l'Entresol, opened in 1720 on

- the initiative of the abbot Alary and closed in 1731 by cardinal Fleury. "Laissez faire" was already a recurring expression in the sketch of a memorandum on free trade, dated 31 July 1742 (*Journal et Mémoire*, ed. J.B. Rathery [Paris: Renouard, 1862] vol. IV: "Memorandum to be written to consider the arguments for and against and to decide whether France should allow the free entry and exit into the kingdom of all national and foreign goods").
14. L.-P. Abeille, *Lettre d'un négociant sur la nature du commerce des grains* (Marseille: 8 October 1763); republished in *Premiers opuscules sur le commerce des grains: 1763-1764*, introduction and analytical table b E. Depitre (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1911) p. 103: "I cannot end this letter better except by applying particularly to the corn trade what a merchant of Rouen said to M. Colbert on commerce in general: *Laissez-nous faire*."
 15. Foucault does not refer to this text again.
 16. D'Argenson, "Lettre à l'auteur du *Journal économique* au sujet de la *Dissertation sur le commerce* de M. le Marquis Belloni," *Journal économique*, April 1751, pp. 107-117; republished in G. Klotz, ed., *Politique et Économie au temps des Lumières* (Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 1995) pp. 41-44: "It is told that M. Colbert gathered several delegates of commerce at his home in order to ask them what he could do for commerce; the most reasonable and least flatterer of them told him simply: *Laissez-nous faire*. Have we ever sufficiently considered the great meaning of these words? This is only an attempt at commentary" (p. 42). The name of Le Gendre is first mentioned in the eighteenth century in Turgot's *L'Eloge de Gournay*, written in 1759 ("We know Le Gendre's words to Colbert: *laissez-nous faire*") in *Œuvres de Turgot*, ed. E. Daire (Paris: Guillaumin, 1844) vol. 1, p. 288; Turgot, *Formation et Distribution des richesses* (Paris: Garnier-Flammariion) pp. 150-151. D'Argenson is also the author of the maxim "do not govern too much (*pas trop gouverner*)." See G. Weulersse, *Le Mouvement physiocratique en France, de 1756 à 1770*, in two volumes (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910) vol. 1, pp. 17-18, which quotes this extract from the tribute that appeared in the *Éphémérides du citoyen*, July, 1768, p. 156: "He composed a book with the excellent object and title: *do not govern too much*." D'Argenson claims to have written a treatise entitled *Pour gouverner mieux, il faudrait gouverner moins* (*Mémoires et Journal*, vol. V, p. 362; quoted by A. Oncken, *Die Maxime "Laissez faire et laissez passer"* (Bern: K.J. Wyss, 1886) p. 58.
 17. D'Argenson, "Lettre à l'auteur du *Journal économique*" p. 44: "Yes, regular and enlightened freedom will always do more for a nation's commerce than the most intelligent domination." He defends the same position with regard to the grain trade in another article in the *Journal économique*, May 1754, pp. 64-79: "Arguments en faveur de la liberté du commerce des grains," republished in G. Klotz, ed., *Politique et Économie*, pp. 45-54.
 18. Helmut Schmidt (born 1918): deputy for the SPD in the Bundestag in 1953, he became Chancellor in May 1974 after the retirement of Willy Brandt. Losing his majority, he gave way to Helmut Kohl in 1982.



INDEX OF NAMES

Compiled by Sue Carlton

Note: Page numbers followed by n refer to notes

Abeille, L.-P. 25n
Adenauer, Konrad 97n, 99n, 104, 147
Aftalion, F. 234n, 263, 264n
Allo, E. 324
Anderson, H.A. 235n
Argenson, R.-L.de Voyer Fd' 20, 22, 24n, 25n, 95n
Aron, Raymond 132, 152n
Attali, J. 20n
Attlee, Clement R. 99n
Auboin, R. 151n
Audegean, P. 49n
Austin, J.L. 264n

Baader, A. 181n, 208n
Bähr, O. 170, 182n
Baldwin, J.W. 48n
Bark, D.L. 97n, 98n, 99n, 100n
Barre, R. 194, 207, 209n
Bauchet, P. 210n
Baudin, L. 132, 151n
Bauer, C. 122n
Bazard, A. 128n
Beaud, M. 235n
Beccaria, Cesare Bonesana 38, 46, 49n, 248, 250-1, 253
Becker, G. 223, 226, 227, 234n, 235n, 236n, 251, 263n, 264n, 268, 269-70, 287n
Beckerath, E. von 122n, 155n
Begault, P. 211n
Benoist, A. de 127n, 180n
Bensen, D.H. 309, 315n
Benthham, Jeremy 12, 22, 24n, 38, 49n, 67, 72-3n, 195, 248, 250-1, 253, 255, 263n, 288n, 320
Berenson, B. 75-6, 96n

Bernholz, P. 263n
Bertani, M. 24n, 50n
Beveridge, W. 110, 126-7n, 142, 144, 189-90, 208n, 210n, 211n, 216, 234n
Bidault, G. 97n
Bilger, F. 97-100n, 122n, 123-4n, 126n, 128n, 153-6n, 157n, 180n, 181n, 262n, 331n
Bismarck, O.E.L. Bismarck-Schönhausen, 1815-98 23n, 108, 135, 144, 192
Blackstone, W. 273, 274, 288n
Blank, T. 88, 99n
Blum, L., 1872-1950, President of the Popular Front 100n, 234n
Boarman, P.M. 99n
Bodon, A. 211n
Böhm, F. 97n, 103, 105, 122n, 123n, 133, 154n, 322
Böhm-Bawerk, E. von 96n
Boisguilbert, Pierre Le Pesant de 31, 48n
Boissonnat, J. 209n
Bonnard, R. 127n
Bonnet, B. 211n
Bourdon, J. 72n
Bourgeois, M. 151n
Brandt, H.K. Frahm, 'Willy', 1913-1992, Chancellor of German Federal Republic 25n, 91, 100n, 186
Brentano, L. 95n, 107, 125-6n
Broyer, S. 124n
Bugeat, J.C. 211n

Carter, J.E., President of the United State, 1976-80 193, 209n
Castel, F. 287n
Castel, R. 72n, 270, 287n
Castelreagh, R.H. Stewart 60n

- Cazes, B. 234n
 Chevalier, J. 180n
 Chevalley, C. 71n
 Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer,
 1874-1965, British Prime Minister
 1940-45 99n, 126n, 161, 180n
 Cohen, D. 212n
 Colbert, J.-B., 1619-83 20, 24n, 25n
 Colliot-Thélène, C. 125n
 Colquhoun, P. 248, 263n
 Commun, P. 122n, 124n, 154n, 331n
 Comte, A. 128n
 Condillac, E.Bonnot de 48n
 Condorcet, M.J.A.N. de Caritat de 276-7,
 288n, 289n
 Coppinger, N. 324
 Cot, M. 127n
 Croissant, K. 181n, 208n, 331n
 Custodi, P. 49n

 Debord, G. 127n
 Defert, D. 24n, 100n, 183n, 317n
 Delaporte, F. 324
 Delbos, V. 288n
 Deleuze, G. 236n
 Delors, J. 156n
 Demangel, D. 211n
 Demeulenaere, P. 287n
 Denord, F. 211n
 Depitre, E. 25n, 48n
 Detoeuf, A. 151n
 Diehl, K. 122n
 Dietzel, H. 122n
 Dostaler, G. 235n
 Dreyfus, H. 264n
 Drouin, P. 234n
 Dubos, J.-B. 72n
 Ducrot, O. 264n
 Dupont de Nemours [Du Pont de Nemours]
 P.S. 48n
 Durand, C. 72n

 Eatherly, B. 257, 264n
 Ehrlich, I. 248, 256, 259, 263n, 264n
 Einaudi, L., 1874-1961, President of Italy 81,
 98n
 El Shakankiri, M. 288n
 Enfantin 128n
 Erhard, L., 1897-1977, Chancellor of the
 German Federal Republic 80-3, 87-8,
 91, 97-9n, 102-4, 144, 146, 323

 Eucken, R. 154n
 Eucken, W. 97n, 103, 105-6, 122-3n, 124n,
 128n, 133, 138, 140, 141, 151n, 153n, 154n,
 155n, 163, 167, 176, 180n, 181n, 240, 322
 Ewald, F. 24n, 188, 208n, 317n, 324

 Ferguson, Adam 280, 289n, 298-9, 300-1,
 302-3, 304, 305-6, 307, 314n
 Fichte, J.G. 86, 95n, 98n
 Fisher, I. 224, 236n
 Fleury, A.-H. de, Cardinal 25n
 Fontana, A. 24n, 50n, 324
 François-Poncet, J. 97n, 98n, 122n, 124n,
 153n
 Franklin, Benjamin 24n, 48n, 316n, 322
 Freud, S. 1, 23n
 Freund, J. 287n
 Friedman, M. 123n, 161, 180n
 Friedrich, C.J. 125n, 157n
 Fugger (bankers, fourteenth to sixteenth
 century) 135, 153n

 Galant, H.G. 97n, 210n
 Gautier, C. 289n, 314n
 Giscard d'Estaing, V., President of the French
 Republic, 1974-81 146, 156n, 179, 194,
 197, 200, 201, 202, 203, 207, 209n, 211n
 Glucksmann, A. 151n
 Göring, H., 1893-1946 109, 110, 122n, 126n
 Gournay, V. de 25n
 Gress, D.R. 97n, 98n, 99-100n
 Grossmann-Doerth, H. 122n, 123n
 Guattari, F. 236n
 Guillaume, M. 234n
 Gurvitch, G. 315n

 Halévy, E. 263n, 288n
 Hayek, F.A. von 23n, 79, 92, 96n, 104,
 110, 123n, 125n, 126n, 132, 161, 171-2,
 173, 182, 189-90n, 193, 208n, 218,
 234n, 289n
 Hegel, G.W.F. 309, 315n, 316n
 Hernandez-Iglesias, F. 234-5n, 236n
 Hill, C. 50n
 Hobbes, Thomas 91, 100n, 298, 308
 Honecker, E. 93, 100n
 Horkheimer, M. 105, 125n
 Huismans, D. 24n
 Hume, David 272, 273-4, 287n, 288n
 Hume, L.J. 73n
 Hunold, A. 157n

- Husserl, E. 103, 104, 120, 122n, 124n, 128n, 322
 Hyppolite, J. 316n

 Jaurès, J. 100n
 Jenny, F. 263n, 264n
 Jessen, J. 122n
 Johnson, L.B., President of the United States, 1963-69 79, 96n, 193, 217, 247
 Jung-Stilling, J.H. 309, 315n

 Kant, I. 57, 61, 71n, 138, 182n, 283
 Kaplan, S.L. 48n
 Kelsen, H. 103, 122n
 Kennedy, J.F., 1917-1963, President of the United States 1961-63 79, 96n, 247
 Kerschen, N. 126n, 210n
 Kershaw, I. 126n
 Keynes, John Maynard 69, 70, 96n, 180n, 220, 235n
 Kiesinger, K.G. 99n, 100n
 Kirzner, I.M. 268, 287n
 Klotz, G. 25n
 Kohl, H. 25n
 Körner, H. 99n
 Kreiterling, W. 100n
 Kunz, P.-A. 97n, 151n

 Lacouture, J. 180n, 210n
 Lagrange, J. 73n, 317n
 Lampe, A. 97n
 Larrère, C. 71n
 Lautenbach, W. 103, 108, 122n
 Lavergne, B. 151n
 Le Gendre, T.[trader] 20, 25n
 Le Mercier de La Rivière, P.P.F.J.H. 24n
 Lefort, R. 208n
 Leo XIII, Pope 99n
 Lepage, H. 153n, 180n, 212, 234n, 235n, 236n, 237n, 262n, 263n
 Liebert, A. 124n
 Lippmann, W. 132-3, 135, 146, 151n, 152n, 153n, 154n, 156n, 160, 161, 180n, 242, 262n
 List, F. 107, 126n
 Locke, John 91, 100n, 287n, 297, 314n
 Locré, J.-G. 72n
 Lovell, A. 287n
 Luxembourg, R. 231, 237n

 Mably, G. Bonnot de 72n
 McCoy, D.R. 48n

 Malebranche, N. 278, 288n
 Mandeville, B. 275, 288n
 Mansholt, S. Leendert 141, 155n
 Mantoux, E. 151n
 Marchetti, V. 72n
 Marcuse, H. 117, 127n
 Marjolin, R. 132, 152n
 Marlio, L. 151n, 152n, 156n
 Marquiset, A. 72n
 Marshall, A. 48n, 128n, 166, 168, 181n
 Marshall, G.C. 79, 97n
 Marx, K. 78, 91, 105, 125n, 127n, 130, 147, 151n, 177, 220-2, 231
 Massé, P. 210n
 Maximilian I, 1459-1519, Holy Roman Emperor, 1493-1519 135, 153n
 Meek, R.L. 315n
 Menger, C. 96n, 181n
 Mercier, E. 151n
 Metternich, Klemens, 1773-1859 60, 72n
 Mevel, C. 324
 Migué, J.-L. 245, 262n
 Miksch, L. 97n, 133, 153n, 180n
 Miller, H.L. 234n
 Mincer, J. 220, 235n
 Mises, L. von 79, 92, 96n, 100n, 123n, 125n, 132, 135, 136, 152n, 153n, 161, 268, 287n
 Mitterand, F. 100n
 Möller, H. 124n
 Montesquieu, Baron de la Brède et de 308
 Moore, M. 257, 264n
 Moulin, A.-M. 324
 Moulin, J. 97n
 Müller-Armack, A. 97n, 103, 104, 123-4n, 144, 146, 155-6n, 157n, 181n, 194, 240, 241

 Napoleon 59, 72n
 Nell-Breuning, O. von 88, 97n, 99n
 Neuman, F. 126n
 North, D.C. 135, 153n

 Oncken, A. 25n

 Paine, T. 310, 316n
 Pareto, V. 271, 287n
 Pascal, B. 53, 71n
 Pasquino, P. 324
 Pavlov, I.P. 287n
 Peacock, A. 123n, 155n
 Perroux, F. 96n, 156-7n

- Pétain, P. 161, 180n
 Peter, H. 97n
 Piatier, A. 151n
 Pietri, N. 97n, 98n, 180n
 Pigou, A.C. 26n, 96n, 142, 155n, 206
 Pious XI (Achille Ratti) 1857-1939,
 Pope 99n
 Polanyi, M. 96n, 174, 183n
 Pribram, K. 155n, 236n
 Priouret, R. 234n

 Quesnay, F. 294

 Rabinow, P. 50n, 264n, 318n
 Radnitsky, G. 263n
 Rathenau, W. 108, 109, 126n
 Revel, J.-F. 234n
 Riboud, M. 234-5n, 236n
 Ricardo, D. 220, 234n, 235n
 Riedel, M. 315-16n
 Ritter, G. 122n
 Rivière, P. 245, 262n
 Robbins, L.C. 222, 235n
 Rodrigues, B.-O. 128n
 Roosevelt, F.D. 1882-1945, President of the
 United States 68, 73n, 78-9, 216
 Röpke, W. 98n, 104, 105, 106, 110, 123-5n,
 126n, 127n, 132-3, 134, 136, 139, 143,
 147-8, 152n, 153-4n, 155n, 156n, 157n, 161,
 176, 183n, 189, 194n, 208n, 240, 241,
 242-3, 262n, 322
 Rosa, J.-J. 234n, 263n, 264n
 Rosanvallon, P. 264n, 314n, 316n, 320, 325n,
 331n
 Rougier, L. 151n, 152n, 161, 162-3, 166, 174,
 180n
 Rousseau, J.-J. 13, 24n, 39, 308
 Rueff, J. 97n, 152n, 196, 210n
 Rüstow, F.W. von 104, 124n, 125n,
 132, 136, 148, 153n, 157n, 160, 241, 242,
 262n, 322

 Saint-Simon, C.H. de Rouvroy de 115, 127n
 Sallust 23
 Salomoni, A. 72n
 Sauvy, A. 48n
 Schacht, H.G.H. 103, 122n
 Schiller, K. 88, 91, 97n, 99n, 100n
 Schleicher, K. von 104, 124n
 Schlözer, A.L. von 309, 315n

 Schmidt, H. 22, 25n, 93, 182n, 186, 208n
 Schmitt, C. 23n
 Schmoller, G. von 122n, 123n, 124n, 125n
 Schneilin, G. 98n
 Schultz, T.W. 220, 223, 225, 227, 235n,
 236-7n, 287n
 Schumacher, H. 98n, 122n
 Schumacher, K. 90, 99n, 100n
 Schumpeter, E. Boody 48n
 Schumpeter, J.A. 48n, 49n, 125n, 147, 156n,
 157n, 176-8, 184n
 Searle, J.R. 263n, 264n
 Sellin, T. 264n
 Senellart, M. 23n, 182n, 327n
 Servoise, R. 126n
 Silverman, H.J. 234n
 Simon, Y. 264n
 Simons, H. Calvert 216, 234n, 323
 Skinner, B.F. 270, 287n
 Smith, Adam 22, 38, 49n, 53, 54, 58, 61,
 130, 131, 183n, 219, 222, 234n, 278-9,
 280, 281, 284, 286, 288-9n, 298, 302,
 320
 Smyth, A.H. 48n
 Solzhenitsyn, A.I. 130, 151n
 Sombart, W. 113-14, 117, 123n, 124n, 127n,
 146, 147, 156n
 Spiethoff, A. 123n, 124n, 127n
 Stephen, L. 23n
 Stigler, G.J. 248, 256, 263n, 264n
 Stoffaës, C. 194, 203, 204, 209n, 212n
 Stoléru, L. 200, 203, 204, 209n, 211n, 212n,
 234n
 Stolleis, M. 182n
 Strawson, P.F. 264n
 Stützel, W. 98n, 124n, 156n, 157n

 Thomas, R.-P. 153n
 Thorndike, E. 287n
 Tribe, K. 127n
 Truman, H.S., 1884-1972, President of the
 United States, 1945-53 79, 96n, 217
 Turgot, A.R.J. 25n, 80, 86, 95n, 97n

 Ulbrich, W. 100n

 Veit, O. 97n
 Veyne, P. 23n, 317
 Villey, D. 100n
 Virgil 23n

Walpole, R. 1, 10, 20, 23n
Walras, L. 128n, 166, 168, 181n, 271, 287n
Weber, A. 103, 125n
Weber, C.K. 71n
Weber, Max 85, 98n, 105, 125n, 127n, 147,
163, 168, 177, 179, 180n, 231, 322

Weisser, G. 97n
Wicksell, J.G.K. 128n, 166, 168, 181n
Wieser, F. von 96n, 125n
Willgerodt, H. 123n, 155n
William II, 1859-1941, German
Emperor 125n



INDEX OF CONCEPTS AND NOTIONS

Compiled by Sue Carlton

Note: Page numbers followed by n refer to notes

- abundance/scarcity 32, 49n, 303
 allocation of scarce resources 108, 223,
 268-9
 mystery of modern abundance 237n
administrative courts 39, 170-1, 182n
administrative law *see* law(s)
administrative monarchy 62
agenda/non-agenda 12, 24n, 73n, 133
 see also Bentham, Jeremy
anarcho-capitalism, American 104,
 133, 145
anarcho-liberalism (Chicago School)
 161, 329
anti-statism *see* state-phobia
arbitration 150, 175-6
 between citizens and public authorities
 170-1
balance/equilibrium, international 7, 14,
 21, 51
behavior 7, 67, 120, 175, 260n, 268,
 287n, 312
 criminal 252, 255-6, 259, 264n
 economic 222-3, 225, 230, 243, 252, 259,
 282
 conformable actions 134, 137, 141,
 153-4n
 object of economic analysis 268-70
 internal rationality of 223
behavior modification 287n
behavioral techniques 270
behaviorism 287n
biopolitics 21-2, 78, 96n, 185, 317, 327
calculation 13, 20, 29, 65, 71n, 94, 223, 272,
 274, 278, 307, 311
 economic 52, 248, 256
 and European balance 5, 6, 14, 52, 55,
 59, 60
 global 56, 58-9
 governmental *ratio* 4, 16
 and liberalism 329
 mercantilist 52-3, 284
 penal 256
capital 96n, 136, 164-5, 179, 221, 236-7n
 from capital to capitalism 105, 167
 contradictory logic of 105, 177
 and labor 220, 221-2, 223-6, 232
 see also human capital
capitalism 117, 262n
 anarcho-capitalism 104, 133, 145
 crises of 70, 96n, 112n, 176
 history of 135, 164-5
 and innovation 231, 237n
 irrational rationality of 105-6,
 166, 177-8
 and labor power 221-2, 224
 liberal order as alternative to 88, 99n
 and the mass 113
 monopoly 133-7, 166, 179
 Nazism and 110, 114-16
 problem of survival of 164-7
 renewal of 171, 173-4
capitalization 144, 197
 see also social policy, privatized
civil society 2, 78, 187, 286, 295-311, 314n,
 319, 330

- competition 21n, 99-100n, 118-21, 128n,
131-2, 134-7, 142, 147, 181n, 209n, 303, 329
absence of 152n, 160
between states 5, 6, 7, 14, 21n, 48n, 52-8,
199-200, 211n
see also Europe, balance/equilibrium
and innovation 231
and monopolies 166, 177, 179
and monopoly 177
order of 141, 155n
principle of formalization 120, 160, 163,
206, 242-3, 262n
regulatory role of mechanisms 145, 175, 179
and socialism 88-9, 91
theory of 166, 168
- conduct
economic 223, 269
see also work
- conduction, principle of, *Führertum* 112
- conformable actions 137-8, 141, 153n
- consumption 96n, 143, 172, 196, 203-4, 222
drugs 257-8
freedom of 68
and permanent redistribution
of income 198
socialized/collective 142, 143-4, 198, 203
and standardization 113-14, 149
theory of 226, 236n
- contract 8-9, 152n, 161, 183n, 245-6, 262n,
273-4
and civil society 300, 303, 308
juridical theory of 276, 294, 312
- control 64, 115, 119, 153n, 173, 182-4n, 228,
257, 259, 262n, 277-8, 285, 287n
of government 311-12
and intervention 139, 189-90, 329
price controls 80-1, 87, 98n, 139
procedures of 67-8, 329
state control (statification) 77, 81, 98n,
112, 132, 187, 189-92, 309
- crime 66, 249-59, 264n, 268, 315n
definition of 249, 251-2
punishment 46, 251, 256, 264n
- crisis/crises 68, 73n, 127n, 192, 193, 195-6,
209n
1929 economic crisis 78, 125n, 197
of capitalism 70, 96n, 117, 122n, 176
consciousness of 68
Germany 78-9, 103, 104, 110, 125n, 195
of governmentality 68, 70, 76, 329
of liberalism 69-70, 209n
unemployment 139
- critical morality 186, 328
- dangers 92, 188, 190, 323, 329
management of 65-8
see also security
- despotism 14, 68, 76, 168-9, 182n
physiocratic conception of 61, 286
- dissidence 76, 331n
- economic analysis 62, 115, 163, 219-27, 230,
321
and behavior/conduct 267-70
and criminality 25, 248, 257
economic grid of intelligibility 240, 246,
248
and non-economic domain 219, 243, 245,
246, 262n
and social phenomena 240
- economic game 52, 54-5, 84, 143, 173, 201-2,
204, 207, 242, 306
- economic historicity, age of 54
- economic policies 138, 153n,
155n, 212n
active and vigilant 133, 138
framework 140-1
French 179, 200, 201-4, 207
German 101-17
and investment in human capital 232
and law court 183n
protectionist 58, 64, 108-9, 114, 115, 135,
153n, 174, 196, 217
and social policy 142-50, 198-207
and *Vitalpolitik* 242
see also Keynesianism; *laissez-faire*; liberalism;
neo-liberalism; ordoliberals/
ordoliberalism
- economic style, *Wirtschaftsstil* 103-4, 123n
- economic system, *Wirtschaftssystem* 123n, 128n,
141, 153n, 166, 198
- economy
free market 85, 95n, 100n, 116-20
protectionism 58, 64, 108, 109, 114, 115,
135, 153n, 174, 196, 217
state-controlled 87
see also social market economy
- empire 5, 21n, 54, 59, 126n
see also state
- empiricism, English 271
- employment
full 80, 95n, 96n, 108, 139, 195-7, 206-7,
212n
see also social policy

- enrichment 14, 18, 53-5, 58, 85, 102
 - collective and unlimited 54, 55
 - mutual 54
- enterprise 123, 147-50, 157n, 160, 175-6, 206, 209n, 230, 241
 - and consumption 226
 - form 241-2
 - free 175, 317
 - society 147, 150, 175, 207, 242-3
 - 'unit' 175, 176, 225
- environment 148, 157n, 175, 241, 242, 287n
 - and investment in human capital 229-30
 - social 146
 - see also Vitalpolitik*
 - variables of 269-71
- environmental technology 259-60, 260-1n
- l'État de droit *see* Rule of Law
- Europe 51-61, 73n
 - agriculture 140-1
 - balance/equilibrium 5, 6, 14, 51-6, 59, 60
 - collective enrichment 54, 58
 - governmentality of the party 191
 - liberalism 42, 43, 81, 115, 196, 328-9
 - neo-liberalism 217-18
 - new European model 54-6
 - rationality 35
 - requirements of economic policy 79-80
 - social policy 142, 197
- European Recovery Program 97n
- exchange 31-2, 35, 44, 46-7, 55, 57, 152n, 196
 - and civil society 296, 301
 - exchange value 85, 146
 - man/partner of 147, 175, 225-6
 - mechanisms of 222
 - monetary 243
 - and shift to competition 118-19, 147, 181n
 - see also* mercantilism
- framework
 - institutional 82-3, 135, 137, 163-4, 173, 174, 178
 - juridical 61-2, 90, 161, 175
 - of organizing actions 140-1
 - political and moral 243, 262n
 - of Rule of Law 169-70, 173, 174
- freedom 11-12, 59, 71n, 209n, 310n, 314n
 - basic 12, 68, 81, 90, 178
 - compensatory mechanisms of 68
 - economic 25n, 67, 81-4, 86-7, 95, 98n, 100n, 102, 116, 160, 286, 323
 - of economic agents/partners 105, 285-6
 - of economic processes 65, 323
 - and independence of the governed 42
 - individual 61-2, 72n, 285
 - juridical conception of 41-2
 - and liberalism 63-5, 67-9, 218-19
 - of market 38, 53-5, 63, 68, 89, 95n, 102, 118, 152n
 - and security 65-6, 72n
 - and socialism 178
- frugality, of government 28-9, 260n, 271
- genealogy 35, 49n
 - of state 84-5
- Gesellschaftspolitik* *see* policy of society
- government
 - art of 1-4, 6, 43n, 95n, 131, 294
 - liberal 51, 61, 65, 67-8, 102, 104, 115, 176, 295, 328-9
 - and limitation 10-11, 14
 - neo-liberal 146, 149-50
 - new 5, 27-8, 32, 56, 61-3, 67, 146-7, 176
 - and political economy 271, 286
 - and rationality 18, 20, 312-13, 327
 - and self-limitation 17, 296
 - socialist 94
 - see also* reason, governmental;
 - self-limitation
 - governmental practice 15-17, 28, 56, 59, 146, 296
 - and liberalism 63, 320, 321
 - limitation of 8, 10-12, 13, 17, 40-1, 327-8
 - and naturalness 15, 16, 21-2n, 327
 - neo-liberalism 90, 147
 - rationalization of 2-4, 317, 319
 - and truth 17-20, 29-30, 32-3, 37, 327-8
 - governmentality 15-16, 30, 186, 293-4, 295-6
 - and basic needs 204-5
 - and calculus of utility 52-3, 251
 - and civil society 310
 - crises of 68-70, 76, 329
 - delimitation of 13, 121
 - excessive 320-1
 - French 193-7
 - German 83-95, 192
 - individualizing 260n
 - liberal 78, 86, 92, 94, 191, 260n, 296, 328
 - and market 121, 246
 - neo-liberal 91, 193
 - of the party 191
 - and problem of the state 78
 - and *raison d'État* 37-45, 53, 318-19

- governmentality - *continued*
 and rationality 313, 319
 and rights 12, 15-16, 39, 42-3, 328
 statified/statifying 191-2
 and totalitarian state 191
- heterogeneity
 of revolutionary axiomatic and
 utilitarian-empirical approaches 42-3
 of subject of interest and subject of right
 276, 282, 296, 328
- history/historicism 3, 103, 122n
- homo oeconomicus* 147, 173, 225-6, 268-71, 276,
 277-8, 282-3, 291-2, 294
 and civil society 296, 305, 307, 329-30
 criminal subject as 249-53
- human capital 210n, 226-32, 235-7n, 243-5,
 252
 theory of 219-20, 329
- independence of the governed 42-3,
 44, 331n
- individualization 144, 261n
- individuals 7, 8, 21-2n, 45, 259-60
 allocating scarce resources 222-3
 and capitalism 113-14
 and civil society 297, 300-4, 307-8, 314n
 and contract 273-4
 and danger 65-6
 and dependence 277
 and enterprise 241
 and freedom 62, 67, 81, 82-3, 285
 health of 230
 and marriage 245
 and monopolies 135, 137
 protection of 202n, 203-4
 see also social policy
 and rights 61-2, 282-3
 and risks 144, 198, 202n, 227-8
 and rule of law 170-5
 spontaneous synthesis of 300-1, 302
 and state 81, 85, 217, 218
 and utility 44
- individuals-subjects 11, 294-5
- inequality 119, 142, 143, 213n, 233n
- inflation 109, 122n, 125n, 139, 152n, 196,
 209n, 210n
- inflationary critique of state 187-90, 328
- institutions 5, 40, 67, 98n, 161, 167, 260n,
 297
 of confinement 34
- German 168
 judicial 8, 9, 37, 150, 176
 statification 112
- interest(s) 44-6, 48n, 300-1, 305-6
 'disinterested' 301, 302
 individual and collective 65-6, 270,
 273-82, 288-9n, 302-3, 307, 312-13,
 329
 and juridical will 273-4
 mutual self-interest 71n
 of state 6, 44
 subject of interest 273-6, 278, 329
- intervention/interventionism 59, 65, 319
 by public authorities 176, 179, 180n
 economic 30, 44, 68, 69, 81, 108, 133,
 140, 145, 152n, 167, 206, 216, 241
 federal 79
 judicial 175-6
 Keynesian 79, 108-9, 111
 legal 151n, 167, 171, 174, 178
 and liberalism 195, 209n
 limiting 81
 Nazism and 95n, 115
 social 159-60, 176, 216, 323, 329
 'invisible hand', theory of 183n, 278-80, 281,
 283, 284, 286, 288-9n, 320
- judicial demand, growth of 174, 176
 juridical-economic order 164, 166
 jurisdiction 182n, 183n, 247
 market as site of 31, 32
 mechanisms of 32-3, 34, 174
 and veridiction 21n, 34-5, 44, 53
- jurists
 and contract 274
 economists as 38
 and *raison d'État* 8, 9, 14, 40
 and theory of law 103
- just price (*justum pretium*) 30-1, 48n
- Keynesianism 69, 80, 81, 87, 91, 126n, 142,
 144, 146, 216, 217, 218, 322
 England and 110-11
 Germany and 103, 108-10
- knowledge, political critique of 36
- laissez-faire* 20, 24n, 25n, 73n, 102, 147, 247,
 270
 disassociating from market economy
 119-20, 131-2
 and economic liberalism 209n

- law(s)
- administrative 39, 44, 182n
 - cosmopolitan 58
 - divine 311
 - economic 16, 146, 161, 269, 296, 321
 - enforcement 254-8, 260n, 264n
 - fundamental 8-9
 - international 56, 58, 83
 - law and order 78, 174, 183n
 - and liberalism 175
 - natural 4, 16-17, 321
 - Nazism 82
 - and the norm 250, 260n
 - penal 12, 38, 248, 264n
 - public 9, 12, 38-41, 43-4, 84, 169
 - revolutionary axiomatic approach 39, 41, 43
 - as rules of the game 174
 - and truth 38
 - universal 169
 - see also* Rule of Law
- legislation, economic 38, 171-2
- legitimacy/illegitimacy 39-40
- of governmental practice 16
 - of sovereign 12-13, 39
 - of state 81-2, 84, 90, 95, 102, 105, 106, 117, 310n
- liberalism 20-2, 60-70, 78, 96n, 117-18, 133, 247, 282, 283-4, 317-22, 324
- American 104, 193, 217-19
 - economic 81, 95n, 107, 116, 125n, 152n, 196, 209n, 222, 284, 323
 - Europe 42, 43, 81, 115, 196, 328-9
 - and frugality of government 29
 - German 90, 107-9, 126n, 240, 322
 - as governmental technology 297
 - liberal art of government 51, 61, 65, 67-8, 102, 104, 115, 176, 295, 328-9
 - of physiocrats 86, 151n
 - positive 133, 152n
 - and primacy of law 175, 179
 - social 125n, 152n
 - and socialism 94
 - sociological 146, 156n
 - and truth 93
 - and utility of government 46-7
 - see also* neo-liberalism;
 - ordoliberals/ordoliberalism
- limitation 7-14, 20-1n, 51, 64, 115
- by calculation of government utility 61
 - de facto* limitation of government practice 10-13
 - external limitation of *raison d'État* 8, 9, 327
 - intrinsic to art of government 10
 - juridical 39, 43
 - and law 7-8, 10
 - self-limitation 6, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21n, 37-8, 44, 72n, 247, 271, 296, 297
- marginal utility, principle of 181n
- market
- and American neo-liberalism 243-5, 247, 323
 - and competition 119-21, 165-6, 242-3
 - for crime 255-9
 - and employment 207, 209n, 220, 221, 224-5, 231
 - and enterprise society 242
 - framework policy 140-2
 - freedom of 38, 53-5, 63, 64, 68, 85, 89, 95n, 102, 116-18, 133, 152n
 - globalization of 55-8, 60, 61
 - and interests 275-6, 284
 - law(s) of 167, 200, 209n, 210n, 211n, 247, 257
 - legal interventionism 167
 - market society 130-1, 145-9
 - non-market relationships 240
 - principles of market economy 89, 116, 117, 119, 131-2, 202, 240
 - see also* *laissez-faire*; social market economy
 - protection and codification of market practices 18
 - as reality 320
 - regulation 138-9, 160
 - relationship with sovereign 293
 - as site of truth (veridiction) 30-5, 37, 38, 44, 48n, 51, 53, 56, 61, 328
 - and social interventionism 68, 159-60, 176, 180n
 - and *Vitalpolitik* 242-3
- mercantilism 5, 14, 33, 52-4, 55, 71n, 284, 320
- micro-powers 186
- military-diplomatic apparatus 5, 6
- monarchy 9, 29, 59, 91, 124n
- administrative 62
- monopolies 64, 119, 133-7, 153n, 157n, 200
- anti-monopoly legislation 64, 68
 - and competition 166, 177, 179
 - and criminality 257-8

- National Socialism 69, 82, 111, 114-15, 127n, 189, 322
see also Nazism
- nationalism 58, 95n
- naturalism 61-2, 120, 329
- naturalness, of governmental practice 15, 16, 21-2n, 327
- Nazism 76, 78, 80, 82, 95n, 106-17, 122n, 126n, 190, 208n, 322
see also National Socialism
- negative tax 202n, 203-6, 212n, 234n
- neo-liberalism
- American 135, 193, 201, 215-19, 239-40, 243-5, 267-9, 323
 - anarcho-capitalism 104, 133, 145, 161
 - definition of income 223-4
 - and negative tax 203
 - French 201, 203, 216, 225
 - general principles of 166
 - German 79, 84-91, 94-5, 101-14, 129-30, 186, 189-97, 216, 225, 328
see also ordoliberals/ordoliberalism
- neo-marginalism 76, 119
- obedience 10, 112, 288n, 303
- ordoliberal program, *ordnungstheorie* 122n, 124n, 153n, 176
- ordoliberals/ordoliberalism 103, 154n, 155n, 176-9, 194
- and competition 117-21, 162-3, 165, 176-7, 179
 - economic constitution 167-8
 - and framework policy 140-1
 - and Nazism 110-17
 - social policy 142-3, 145, 149, 159-61, 200-1, 207, 240-3
 - and state control 189
- organizing actions, framework policy 140-1
- penal system 34, 45-6, 77, 248-57
- physiocrats 22, 57, 58, 80, 86, 145-6, 284-6, 320-1
- and despotism 14, 61, 286
 - Economic Table 285, 320
 - and good/natural price 31, 48n, 53-4
 - and interests 275
 - sovereign and market 284, 293
 - and spontaneous mechanisms of the economy 61
- planning 79-80, 108-10, 171-2, 182-3n, 195, 283
- and loss of freedom 91, 95n, 178, 218
 - opposition to 88, 91, 99-100n, 114, 139, 171-2, 190, 217, 218, 289n
- police state 17, 59, 60, 72n, 86, 92-3
- and *raison d'État* 5, 7-8, 9, 14, 37, 52, 55, 284
 - and Rule of Law 168-9, 179, 182n
- policy for life *see Vitalpolitik*
- policy of society (*Gesellschaftspolitik*) 146, 156n, 159-60, 178, 240-1, 261n, 329
- political economy
- and analysis of labor 219-20
 - as critique of governmental reason 283-4
 - and marginalism 181n
 - and public law 38
 - as science lateral to the art of government 286
 - and self-limitation of governmental reason 13-17, 22n, 29, 32-3, 271, 327-8
- political power 14, 39, 131, 276, 280, 293, 298, 303
- price
- de rigueur* 48n
 - good/natural/normal 31, 32, 48n, 53-4
 - just 30-1, 48n
 - proportional 48n
- protectionism, economic 58, 64, 108-9, 114, 115, 135, 153n, 174, 196, 217
- radicalism, English 40-1
- raison d'État* 3-10, 12, 19, 21n, 22, 27-9, 33, 44, 45, 51-2, 217, 327
- and law 8, 9, 14, 40, 41
 - and liberalism 318-19, 320
 - and market freedom 102
 - new 53
 - and police state 5, 7-8, 9, 14, 37, 52, 55, 284
 - and sovereign 284, 293, 312
- rationality
- economic 92, 106, 119, 148, 258, 282, 303, 323
 - European 35-6
 - in governmental practice 3-4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 15, 20, 56, 92-4, 286, 311-13, 322, 327
 - of *homo oeconomicus* 278, 282, 294
 - of human behavior 223, 312-13
 - irrational rationality of capitalism 105-6, 166, 177-8
 - and penal system 248, 256
 - social 106

- reason
 - governmental 10-17, 20-2, 39, 283-4, 293, 311, 322
 - new 33, 37, 44-6, 53, 63, 65, 271, 327-8, 329
 - see also rationality, in governmental practice
 - of the least state 28, 37, 45, 53
- rechtsstaat* see Rule of Law
- regulation
 - by the market 30, 145, 323
 - internal 10-11, 12, 116
 - of the market 18, 30, 57, 138
 - regulatory actions 138-9, 154n
 - see also intervention/interventionism
- rights
 - basic 12, 21n, 41, 42, 43n, 44, 62, 81
 - see also freedom
 - imprescriptible 8, 39, 42n
 - natural 8, 11, 15, 61, 274, 294
 - Rights of Man 39, 42-3, 310n, 328
- royal power 7-9, 37
- Rule of Law (*l'État de droit*) (*Rechtsstaat*)
 - 168-74, 178-9, 181-3n, 218, 260n, 289n, 321
- security 65-6, 102, 206, 216, 274, 278, 288n, 303, 315n, 329
 - social 97n, 187-8, 190, 197-200, 202, 207, 210-12n
 - see also social policy
- self-limitation 6, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21n, 37-8, 44, 72n, 247, 271, 296, 297
 - see also limitation
- situationism 127n
- social market economy 97n, 99n, 124n, 145, 155n, 156n, 194, 209n, 323, 328
- social policy 134, 141-50, 157n
 - and economic policies 142-50, 198-207
 - French 197-207
 - individual versus socialist 144, 155n
 - ordoliberals/ordoliberalism and 142-3, 145, 149, 159-61, 200-1, 207, 240-3
 - privatized 144, 145
 - see also policy of society (*Gesellschaftspolitik*)
- socialism 69, 76, 88-9, 90-4, 94-5n, 99n, 189, 213n, 283
 - democratic 184n
 - and economic rationality 92
 - English Labour party 110
 - state socialism 108-9, 144, 283, 322
 - transition to 177-8
 - and utopia 219
- sovereign/sovereignty 2-5, 6, 8, 43n, 72n, 288n, 292-6, 300, 303
 - abuse 13, 41
 - and economy 280-6
 - granting monopolies 135
 - and law 39, 168-9
 - and market 293-4
 - and penal system 45-6
 - political 2, 22n, 66, 83, 84, 328
 - rationality of 312-13
 - right of/legitimacy 12-13, 18, 37, 39-40, 45, 81-2
- state
 - bourgeois-capitalist 112-14
 - and civil society 78, 187, 189
 - see also civil society
 - economic 86, 303
 - and empire 5, 6
 - see also Empire
 - history of 6
 - specific plurality of 5
 - totalitarian 83, 187, 190-1
 - and unlimited growth 27, 111, 115, 186
 - see also police state; *raison d'État*
- state-phobia 76-8, 187-8, 191
- statification (*Étatisation*) 77, 81, 98n, 112, 132, 187, 189-92, 309
- subject(s) 3, 4, 6, 11, 45-6
 - agreement between sovereign and 8-9
 - economic 175, 223, 253, 259n, 282, 294, 301-3
 - see also *homo oeconomicus*
 - and freedom and submission 10, 11-12, 22n
 - of interest 272-6, 278, 282, 328-9
 - regulating behavior of 7
 - of right 22, 274-6, 292, 294-5, 328-9, 330
 - and sovereign 45, 66, 284
- truth, regime of 18-20, 29, 33, 37
- universals 2, 3, 23-4n
 - historical 317-18
- urban revolt, preventing 18

- utilitarianism 16, 22, 40-1, 43, 250,
251, 328
calculus of utility 52, 251
- veridiction 36
and jurisdiction 21n, 34-5, 44, 53
market as site of 30-5, 37, 38, 44, 48n, 51,
53, 56, 61, 95n, 328
- vitalpolitik* (politics/policy of life) 148,
157n, 242
- Weberianism 105-6
- wisdom of the prince 17, 20
- work
as economic conduct 223
time factor 220-1, 224-5